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Abstract 
The Chinese government frequently threatens that meetings between its trading partners’ 
officials and the Dalai Lama will be met with animosity and ultimately harm trade ties with 
China. We run a gravity model of exports to China from 159 partner countries between 1991 
and 2008 to test to which extent bilateral tensions affect trade with autocratic China. In order 
to account for the potential endogeneity of meetings with the Dalai Lama, the number of 
Tibet Support Groups and the travel pattern of the Tibetan leader are used as instruments. 
Our empirical results support the idea that countries officially receiving the Dalai Lama at the 
highest political level are punished through a reduction of their exports to China. However, 
this ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ is only observed for the Hu Jintao era and not for earlier periods. 
Furthermore, we find that this effect is mainly driven by reduced exports of machinery and 
transport equipment and that it disappears two years after a meeting took place. 
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“We will take corresponding measures to make the relevant countries realise their mistakes.” 
Zhu Weiqun, executive deputy head of the Communist party's United Front Work Department 
 
"There is a Tibetan saying: some wounds in the mouth recover by themselves." 
Tendzin Gyatsho, 14th Dalai Lama 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Chinese autonomous region of Tibet is an area of great economic and geo-strategic 
significance as it holds considerable amounts of natural resources and connects China to 
South and Central Asia. In addition, Tibet is known as ‘Asia’s water tower’ since important 
rivers such as the Mekong, Yangtze and Yellow river originate in the region. Tibet’s political 
status represents a long-run cause of conflict both in China and in international relations that 
revolve around the question of whether the incorporation of Tibet into China was in 
accordance with international law.4 China considers the status of Tibet as an internal affair, in 
which outside interference is rejected. As Goldstein (1998) notes, international opinion plays 
an important role in conflicts over regional independence since “the ambiguity about when 
entities have the right to seek self-determination has made international opinion an important 
dimension of such disputes” (p. 83). In light of this, the Chinese administration has 
recognized that its position on Tibet’s status not only needs to be enforced domestically, but 
also internationally.5 By opposing any notion from abroad that might challenge the status-quo 
of the region, China not only aims to contain the spread of unrest inside Tibet, but also seeks 
to weaken the worldwide Tibetan independence movement. 
Within this context, the Dalai Lama, in his position as leader of the Tibetan community, is 
seen as a threat to the integrity of the Chinese nation. Consequently, meetings of foreign 
officials with the Dalai Lama are a constant source of bilateral diplomatic tensions with China. 
In addition to purely diplomatic threats, China more-or-less openly threatens that it will 
respond to meetings between its trading partners’ officials and the Tibetan leader with 
measures that will result in a deterioration of their trade relationships. An article published in 
                                                          
4
 See Goldstein (1997) for a historical overview on the so-called ‘Tibet Question’, i.e., the long-lasting conflict over 
the political status of Tibet. 
5
 According to an official government bulletin, China identifies the issue of Tibet as one of the “most important and 
sensitive” core issues to be respected by China’s partners (available at: http://www.gov.cn/misc/2009-
05/27/content_1326253.htm). 
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China Daily – a state-run newspaper, known as a mouthpiece of the Communist party – 
clearly advises against outside interference in the Tibet question “if they [countries] want to 
remain on good terms with China.” 6  The government’s decisiveness on this matter is 
reflected in instances such as the prominent case of France, where the country was crossed 
off the travel agenda of two Chinese trade delegations in 2009 in retaliation to a meeting 
between French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama. In an interview conducted in 
2007, the Dalai Lama himself acknowledged the unwillingness of state officials to receive 
him, so as not to jeopardize the intense economic ties that their countries have established 
with China.7 Beyond existing anecdotal evidence, no empirical analysis has, to the best of 
our knowledge, thus far been conducted to unveil whether China responds to meetings 
between its trading partners and the Dalai Lama with any systematic economic punishment. 
This paper aims to fill this gap. Moreover, results may offer valuable insights to which extent 
political relations matter for trade with (autocratic) emerging economies. 
The role of political determinants of trade is currently in the focus of the literature (e.g, Aidt 
and Gassebner 2010, Gassebner, Keck and Teh 2010, Kastner 2007, Méon and Sekkat 
2008, Nitsch and Schumacher 2004). Previous research has shown that the bilateral political 
climate plays an important role in trade relationships (e.g., Pollins 1989, Morrow, Siverson 
and Taberes 1998). Also, diplomatic exchanges between trading partners foster bilateral 
trade through diplomatic representations (Rose 2007) and state visits (Nitsch 2007). The 
state of political relations between China and its trading partners is likely to be even more 
important as a determinant of bilateral trade than it is in the case of trade between free 
market economies. Whilst prices and other product characteristics should – at least in theory 
– be the sole determinants of import decisions in a market system, the Chinese government 
exerts additional influence on commercial activity. In this regard, Aidt and Gassebner (2010) 
show theoretically and empirically that a country’s involvement in international trade differs 
between democracies and autocracies. Since China is neither a democracy, nor a free 
market economy, its administration has greater capacity to impact on trading decisions than 
the government in a democratic free market economy. Such significant scope for government 
intervention thus gives leeway for the utilization of trade flows as foreign policy tool. Since a 
country’s policy towards the Dalai Lama influences its bilateral relations with China and may 
provoke retaliatory responses from Beijing, we hypothesize that a trade-deteriorating effect is 
caused by foreign officials receiving the Dalai Lama. 
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 “Wrong stance on Tibet hinders ties with China,” China Daily, March 5th 2009, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/05/content_7538147.htm 
7
 “Dalai Lama Visit Jeopardizes German Business Interests”, Spiegel Online, October 17th 2007, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,506166,00.html. 
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We run a gravity model of exports to China from 159 partner countries between 1991 and 
2008 to test for political influences on China’s trading decisions. The paper analyzes whether 
countries that receive the Dalai Lama are economically punished by the Chinese through a 
reduction of their exports to China. It is also tested whether the size of the punishment 
increases with the rank of the highest official receiving the Tibetan leader and how the effect 
evolves over time. Furthermore, we provide results when controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of meetings with the Dalai Lama and show results based on disaggregated 
trade data to deepen our understanding of what we call the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’. 
Our empirical results confirm the existence of a negative effect of Dalai Lama receptions at 
the highest level on exports to China for the Hu Jintao era (2002-2008). Meetings of a head 
of state or head of government with the Dalai Lama lead to a reduction of exports to China by 
8.1% or 16.9% on average, depending on the estimation technique used. This effect is 
mainly driven by reduced exports of machinery and transport equipment and it disappears in 
the second year after a meeting took place. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview on the literature regarding 
the link between bilateral political relations and international trade to get insights how 
meetings with the Dalai Lama might adversely affect trading relationships. In Section 3, we 
present anecdotal evidence illustrating how the bilateral climate between China and its 
trading partners deteriorates after foreign officials’ meetings with the Tibetan leader and 
formulate our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical approach, the data used and the 
empirical results, which show whether countries officially receiving the Dalai Lama are 
economically punished through trade reductions. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings 
and concludes. 
 
2. Political influences on trade and the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ 
While pure economic theory suggests that economic actors base their trading decisions 
entirely on intrinsic characteristics of goods and services such as price, quantity and quality, 
political relations exert additional influence on trade. In this regard, trade ties can be 
exploited as a foreign policy tool by governments to influence political decisions of trading 
partners. As such, by manipulating trade flows, a country can exploit the trade dependency 
of its trading partners in order to force their governments to abide by its political viewpoints. 
Bilateral trade flows can thus be used as an instrument of political pressure and leverage 
against countries with conflicting interests (Hirschman 1945, Baldwin 1985). Hereby, the 
degree of political compliance that can be induced by the dominant country increases with 
the asymmetry of the trade interdependency between the two trading partners (Keohane and 
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Nye 1977, Richardson and Kegley 1980). With the rapidly increasing size of the Chinese 
economy, the asymmetry of trade dependencies between China and its trading partners 
shifts in China's favor. This development enables China to enforce political compliance 
among its trading partners to an increasing extent. 
Several theoretical concepts provide an explanation why politics matters for bilateral trade 
relationships. Pollins (1989) has developed a public choice model of bilateral trade flows. 
Extending the concept of welfare to include political ties, import decisions are influenced by 
the place of origin of the traded goods and services. Based on security concerns, risk-averse 
importers reward political friends and punish adversaries. Regarding hostile relationships 
between countries, Gowa and Mansfield (1993) argue that gains from trade are the source of 
security externalities as trade-induced efficiency frees resources for military use in the 
economy of the trading partner. Consequently, it is in a country’s strategic interest to 
concede such gains exclusively to befriended countries and deny them to enemies. States 
may thus rely on trade interdependencies to strategically reward allies or punish adversaries. 
Furthermore, Kastner (2007) argues that states may disrupt trade with their partners in order 
to signal resolve in a bilateral disagreement they may have with their trading partners over 
matters unrelated to trade. 
Prior empirical analyses have confirmed that the state of bilateral political relations affects 
international trade. A first strand in the literature focuses on the conflict-trade nexus and 
analyzes the role of bilateral climate on trade relationships. While some literature on the link 
between military conflicts and trade exists (e.g., Glick and Taylor 2005, Keshk, Pollins and 
Reuveny 2004, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008, Oneal, Russet and Berbaum 2003), 
conflicts do not need to be militarized in order to influence trade flows. An anticipated conflict 
alone might trigger reductions of bilateral trade due to “the threat of future government action 
to restrict trade” (Morrow, Siverson and Taberes 1998, p. 650). Exploiting bilateral event data 
on conflict and cooperation for the period 1955-1978, Pollins’ (1989) empirical results support 
the hypothesis that greater amity between trading partners increases trade while greater 
hostility has a trade-reducing effect. Gowa and Mansfield (1993) also find that alliances 
between trading partners foster bilateral trade. 8  Combining both approaches, Morrow, 
Siverson and Taberes (1998) find that joint democracy and common interests of commercial 
partners increase bilateral trade between commercial partners whereas no effect is found for 
conflicts and alliances between countries. In a more recent study, Kastner (2007) finds 
evidence that the trade-reducing impact of bad bilateral political relations is reduced if 
internationalist economic interests are strong, which is proxied by low trade barriers. 
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 Incorporating new trade theory, empirical evidence in Gowa and Mansfield (2004) suggests that alliances (and 
other measures of bilateral relations) are more important factors in trade under increasing returns to scale than 
under constant returns to scale. 
6 
 
More tangible than the abstract concept of bilateral climate, a second strand in the literature 
on the link between bilateral political relations and international trade finds that diplomatic 
exchanges among trading partners foster bilateral trade through diplomatic representations 
and state visits. Analyzing export flows from 22 countries for 2002 and 2003 in a gravity 
framework, Rose (2007) finds that the size of a country’s diplomatic service has a positive 
impact on its exports: each additional consulate leads to an increase of exports by about six 
to ten percent. Focusing on export flows of 17 Spanish regions for 1995-2003, Gil-Pareja, 
Llorca and Martínez Serrano (2008) find that Spanish regional trade agencies abroad have a 
positive impact on exports. This effect is even greater than the export-promoting impact of 
Spanish embassies and consulates situated in the respective partner countries. Most 
relevant to our study, Nitsch (2007) finds empirical evidence that state and official visits do 
have a trade-increasing effect. Estimating export flows from France, Germany and the United 
States for 1948-2003, he finds that one visit is associated with an increase in exports of 
between eight and ten percent. 
Political relations influence bilateral trade with the extent of this influence varying between 
political regimes “since governments in free market economies still set the rules under which 
firms import and export, while governments in managed economies directly negotiate the 
terms of trade” (Morrow, Siverson and Taberes 1998, p. 649). Thus, the influence of 
international politics on trading decisions is expected to be of higher importance in autocratic 
countries such as China than in established market democracies. As trade regulations are 
stricter and state-owned enterprises are of greater importance for economic activity in most 
emerging economies, their trading decisions are often more politically driven, turning trade 
ties into a transaction channel via which the political agenda of a country can be globally 
disseminated and enforced upon trading partners. In line with this, Mansfield, Milner and 
Rosendorff (2000) discuss regime differences in trade policy that emerge as the chief 
executive does not rely on the approval of a legislative majority in an autocracy. In a related 
article, Aidt and Gassebner (2010) show theoretically and empirically that governments of 
autocracies exert more influence on trade flows than democratic administrations, which is 
explained by a lack of political accountability faced by the executive of an autocratic regime. 
Taken together, in the case of China, the significant scope of government influence in the 
Chinese economy provides the country’s political leaders with all means required to manage 
trade in such a way that it rewards countries that adhere to China’s political preferences and 
punishes those that do not. Since the Chinese government seeks to contain the expression 
of opinions that challenge the status quo of Tibet, it reacts with harsh objections to any 
meeting of foreign officials with the Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan community. 
Therefore, a deterioration of the bilateral political climate and a decrease in bilateral 
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diplomatic exchanges, as a result of foreign officials meeting the Dalai Lama, may lead to a 
systematic reduction of exports to China through government influence. For example, 
countries receiving the Tibetan leader might be punished directly through a reduction of trade 
missions and, thus, exports of goods typically purchased in the ambit of such missions. Also, 
tariff and non-tariff barriers might be raised and negotiations on free trade agreements might 
be postponed as a response to receptions of the Dalai Lama by foreign officials. 
At first glance, it may seem odd that China would be willing to forgo the gains that would 
arise from trade under efficient importing decisions in order to punish trading partners who 
receive the Dalai Lama. However, China’s political leadership may be willing to bear the 
economic and political costs that arise from diverting trade away from Dalai Lama-receiving 
countries if such ‘punishment’ increases the likelihood of its political survival. As argued in 
Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000), political leaders in autocratic regimes also need to 
maintain political support to ensure their political survival, which is also reflected in their trade 
policy. By exerting economic pressure on Dalai Lama-receiving countries, the Chinese 
administration seeks to maintain the territorial integrity of China and intends to strengthen the 
stability of its Communist regime in the multi-ethnic country. However, such an economic 
punishment mechanism will only prevail as long as the expected political gains from 
stabilizing the regime outweigh the losses from trade diversion. 
Furthermore, in addition to direct government action, a trade-deteriorating effect of official 
Dalai Lama receptions may operate through consumer behavior. Prior empirical research 
indicates that bilateral opinions (or the affinity between nations) impact on trade as they shift 
consumer preferences (Disdier and Mayer 2007, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2009).9 
Similarly, the state of bilateral political relations between China and its trading partners might 
have important repercussions for consumer behavior. Since media information on foreign 
officials meeting with the Dalai Lama may alter public opinions towards the countries 
receiving the Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama receptions can be expected to affect the demand 
for consumption goods, most likely, that for certain symbolic goods that are characteristic of 
the country hosting the Dalai Lama.10 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Using Eurobarometer opinion data on the accession of Central and East European countries to the European 
Union, Disdier and Mayer (2007) show that ‘bilateral affinity’ has a trade-increasing effect. In a related study, 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) find that trade increases significantly with their measure of bilateral trust 
obtained from Eurobarometer surveys. Beyond its effect on trade via trust, cultural similarities seem to impact 
positively on trade volumes via other channels. 
10
 For example, the disruption of the Olympic torch relay of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games through the French 
capital Paris by pro-Tibet activists caused irritation among the Chinese public and subsequently sparked calls for 
a consumer boycott against French products. 
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3. Anecdotal Evidence and Hypotheses 
Official receptions of the Dalai Lama and even the mere announcement of such receptions 
regularly lead to diplomatic tensions between the People’s Republic of China and countries 
hosting the Dalai Lama. Since coming into exile in 1959 until the end of 2009, the Tibetan 
leader visited 62 countries on all continents.11 Although the Dalai Lama himself emphasizes 
the non-political nature of his visits, he uses his travels as an opportunity to meet foreign 
politicians in order to discuss – among other issues – the situation in Tibet. The Chinese 
administration emphasizes that Tibet forms an integral part of China and sees the Dalai 
Lama as a pretentious state leader with a separatist agenda regarding Tibet. Therefore, any 
meeting of foreign officials with the Buddhist monk is perceived by Beijing as interference 
with internal affairs. Despite Chinese opposition, many countries have, to an increasing 
extent, recognized the Dalai Lama as a notable religious leader, subsequently granting him 
considerable attention. At the same time, China has increased pressure on other countries to 
not receive the exiled Tibetan leader in any form. In this section, we study anecdotal 
evidence on how the bilateral climate between China and its trading partners is influenced by 
foreign officials’ meetings with the Dalai Lama and derive our hypotheses.12 
 
Hypothesis 1: Trade-deteriorating effect of Dalai Lama meetings 
In addition to purely diplomatic threats, China increasingly exerts economic pressure on 
foreign governments to discourage them from meeting with the Dalai Lama. Already in 1989, 
when the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, China threatened to cut 
economic ties with Norway if the Norwegian king or government attended the ceremony.13 
The growing assertiveness of the Chinese administration towards foreign dignitaries’ 
meetings with the Tibetan leader reflects China’s rising economic power. As such, this 
growing economic power provides China with the leverage needed to advance its political 
interests. 
The Dalai Lama was officially invited to the White House for the first time in 1991 by George 
Bush senior. The reception marked a pronounced change from the policy of former US 
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 In 1967, the Dalai Lama travelled outside India for the first time in order to visit Japan and Thailand. His first trip 
to Europe was in 1973 where he visited 12 countries in 75 days. In 1979, he travelled to the United States and 
Canada for the first time. 
12
 Of course, the incidents of diplomatic threats listed below are not exhaustive, but provide some illustrative 
examples. Moreover, many diplomatic threats operate in the shadows, as can be seen in the example of a letter 
written by China’s ambassador Zhang Yun to the Dutch Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Henk Jan Ormel. In the text, which, to the surprise of the ambassador, was made public, the Chinese embassy 
warned that Sino-Dutch relations might be negatively affected by a planned meeting between Dutch members of 
parliament and the Dalai Lama (“’We are clear: no dalai lama visits”, NRC Handelsblad, May 7th 2009, available 
at: http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2234645.ece/We_are_clear_no_dalai_lama_visits). 
13
 “China Threatens to Cut Ties with Norway over Nobel Award”, The Associated Press, October 19th 1989. 
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presidents and sparked immediate protest from the Chinese.14 During the subsequent two 
Clinton and Bush presidencies, the Dalai Lama has been a visitor to the White House a 
further nine times, provoking regular protest from Beijing. In 2007, the US Congress awarded 
the Congressional Gold Medal - the highest civil honor conferred in the United States - to the 
Dalai Lama. The act was compounded by the fact that the US president personally attended 
the award ceremony. In a statement issued one day later by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Spokesperson Liu Jianchao emphasized that the award “ha[d] severely hurt the 
feelings of the Chinese people and gravely undermined the relationship between China and 
the US,” a wording that is characteristic of the Chinese reactions to countries officially 
receiving the Dalai Lama. He furthermore “urge[d] the US to take effective measures 
immediately to undo the severe adverse impact of its erroneous act.”15 In 2009, President 
Barack Obama decided not to receive the Dalai Lama. The media deemed the decision 
“unprecedented” and surmised that the president had strategically delayed the reception until 
after his state visit to Beijing. The meeting finally took place in February 2010 and caused 
considerable discontent in Beijing. Chinese authorities emphasized that the move damaged 
US-Chinese relations, which, in turn, would undermine the United States’ recovery from the 
current economic crisis.16 
Before Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s reception of the Dalai Lama in 1995, the 
Chinese prime minister warned his Italian counterpart that “if this [the Italian] government will 
adopt a policy that could damage a matter of principle [for China], it may also damage trade 
relations.”17 Facing potential trade retaliations by the Chinese, Berlusconi openly admitted to 
the Dalai Lama that the international community was facing a dilemma, “caught between the 
importance of maintaining trade relations and protecting human rights.”18 The decision to 
meet the Tibetan leader despite Chinese threats was judged as “courageous” by both the 
Italian media and the Dalai Lama himself. 
In contrast, Germany’s political leaders refrained for a long time from meeting with the Dalai 
Lama. In this regard, a 1995 New York Times article critically assessed that German foreign 
policy was aimed at avoiding political conflict over human rights issues with China, so as not 
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 “On my mind; Beijing Heart Attack”, The New York Times, April 19th 1991, p. A27, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/19/opinion/on-my-mind-beijing-heart-attack.html. 
15
 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular Press Conference”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, October 18th 2007, available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t373809.htm. 
16
 “Destiny of Tibet 'in hands of people'”, China Daily, February 3rd 2010, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/03/content_9417649_2.htm. 
17
 “Li Peng "diffida" Berlusconi; Il Cavaliere l'aveva promesso a Pannella. Ma Pechino avverte: "Sono in pericolo 
le relazioni commerciali"”, La Stampa, June 15th 1994, p. 4, own translation. 
18
 “"Italia, grazie per il coraggio"; Il leader tibetano a Palazzo Chigi, per la prima volta un governo italiano sfida il 
veto cinese”, La Stampa, June 18th 1994, p. 7, own translation. 
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to endanger lucrative trade ties with the emerging economy.19 Bilateral discontent emerged 
between China and Germany when Chancellor Angela Merkel deviated from this protocol by 
receiving the Dalai Lama in the chancellery in 2007. Merkel’s predecessor Gerhard 
Schröder, known for his keenness on good economic relations with China, criticized the 
decision as a mistake, bearing in mind the detrimental effect the meeting may have on 
bilateral relations with Beijing. In the forerun to the Dalai Lama’s announced visit to Berlin, 
Chinese politicians warned that the meeting would severely damage economic ties. In the 
aftermath of this meeting, several other bilateral meetings at various political levels were 
cancelled. 
Sino-French relations worsened as French government sources announced a meeting 
between Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama. Chinese officials promptly insinuated that 
trade ties with France could suffer unless the meeting was cancelled. China sent a strong 
message to France, which held the EU presidency at the time, by cancelling the 11th annual 
EU-China summit on rather short notice.20 In addition, the media reported that the finalization 
of a contract to purchase 150 passenger planes from Airbus was suddenly postponed 
without further explanation. After the actual meeting took place, Vice Foreign Minister He 
Yafei emphasized that it had “sabotage[d] the political basis of China-France and China-EU 
relations” and furthermore warned of “serious consequences” which France alone would 
have to bear.21 In early 2009, France was crossed off the travel agenda of two Chinese trade 
delegations. The first delegation alone signed 15 billion US dollars’ worth of trade deals in 
other European countries. Furthermore, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao did not pay any 
state visit to France during his trip to Europe in January 2009. When asked to comment on 
the itinerary of his European tour, he was cited saying: “I looked at a map of Europe on the 
plane. My trip goes around France. […] We all know why."22 
The case of Mongolia serves as a further illustration of China’s antagonism towards Dalai 
Lama-receiving countries. The Dalai Lama has visited the country on several occasions 
since 1979 as the country has strong historical and cultural links with Tibet. As reported by 
media sources in 2002, China imposed a temporary ban on imports from Mongolia and 
blocked the only railway link between the two countries in response to the reception of the 
Tibetan leader by the Mongolian Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar. The import ban was 
                                                          
19
 “Seeking China Deal, Bonn Shuns Rights Issue”, The New York Times, July 13th 1995, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/13/world/seeking-china-deal-bonn-shuns-rights-issue.html. 
20
 The meeting had originally been scheduled to take place on December 1st in France where over a hundred 
high-ranking Chinese politicians and business leaders would have met with their European counterparts. 
21
 “He Yafei Lodges a Strong Protest to France over Sarkozy’s Meeting with the Dalai Lama,” Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 12th 2010, available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/gjlb/3291/3293/t525570.htm. 
22
 “Premier: We all know why”, China Daily, February 2nd 2009, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-02/03/content_7440286.htm. 
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lifted after only one day and no further official receptions of the Dalai Lama took place in 
Mongolia – despite him visiting the country again in 2006. 
We thus hypothesize that a deterioration of the bilateral political climate and a decrease in 
bilateral diplomatic exchanges, as a result of foreign officials meeting the Dalai Lama, leads 
to a significant reduction in exports to China. Our first hypothesis reads as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a trade-deteriorating effect caused by foreign officials 
receiving the Dalai Lama. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Importance of the rank of the dignitary met 
Political leaders are aware that meetings with the Dalai Lama put considerable stress on 
countries' bilateral relations with China, and that it may also have negative implications for 
the economic ties between them. A first alternative to not receiving the Dalai Lama at all is to 
meet with him but not in official capacity as head of state. For example, when the Dalai Lama 
planned to visit Switzerland in 2008, Pascal Couchepin announced that he would be meeting 
with the religious leader not in his function as President of the Swiss Confederation but as 
Minister of Culture.23 Similarly, the Clinton administration, granted him the opportunity to visit 
the White House, even though he was formally received only by a minister and not the 
president himself. Despite official sources emphasizing that no formal encounter between the 
Dalai Lama and the US president was scheduled, Clinton nevertheless dropped in during the 
talks. In September 1995, a New York Times article concluded that a better treatment of the 
Dalai Lama “would [have] cost us [the US] trade with the Chinese.”24 
As a second alternative, some leaders prefer to delegate the task to lower-ranked 
government representatives in the hope of reducing the negative effect that such meetings 
may have on bilateral relations with China. Nevertheless, by employing such a strategy, the 
government still manages to sedate pro-Tibet lobby groups, human rights organizations and 
other sympathizers of the Dalai Lama. For example, during his trip to the Netherlands in 
2009, the Dalai Lama was received by some members of parliament and met with the 
country’s foreign minister during a conference between Dutch religious leaders. Prime 
Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, however, reportedly feared that a personal encounter with 
the Tibetan leader would bring “unwarranted risk” to Sino-Dutch relations.25 A similar strategy 
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 “Dalai Lama sagt Besuch in der Schweiz ab”, NZZ Online, September 13th 2008, available at: 
http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/schweiz/dalai_lama_sagt_besuch_in_der_schweiz_ab__1.831028.html. 
24
“On My Mind; If He Can, Can I?” The New York Times, September 15th 1995, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/15/opinion/on-my-mind-if-he-can-can-i.html. 
25
 “Dalai lama meets foreign minister, but not prime minister,” NRC Handelsblad, June 5th 2009, available at: 
http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2262841.ece/Dalai_lama_meets_foreign_minister,_but_not_prime_minister. 
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seems to have been employed in Germany in 2008, exactly one year after the first reception 
of the Dalai Lama by a German chancellor. In what could be interpreted as giving in to 
Chinese pressure, high-ranking members of the German government avoided a further 
encounter with the Dalai Lama, referring to their “tight schedules.” Allowing all parties to save 
face, the Tibetan leader was received by the President of the German Bundestag, the 
Minister of Economic Cooperation and other non-government politicians.26 
A shift to lower-ranked officials is also observable in Latin American countries. The Dalai 
Lama embarked on several trips throughout the region between 1989 and 2006. With respect 
to Dalai Lama receptions, a clear downward trend can be observed in terms of the rank of 
dignitaries met in the most important destination countries in the region, namely, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. While the Tibetan leader had been received by the respective 
president of these countries up to the year 1999, he has had to contend himself with being 
received by dignitaries of less political importance ever since. The case of Chile in 2006 
provides a particularly interesting example where the local media suspected Chilean 
president Michelle Bachelet of avoiding a meeting with the Dalai Lama so as not to 
jeopardize ongoing negotiations for the country’s first trade agreement with China.27 By that 
time, China had also become Chile’s second most important trading partner after the United 
States. 
While receptions of the Dalai Lama by official state representatives such as government 
members may provoke trade reductions, the matter should be different in instances where 
the Dalai Lama met with leaders of the political opposition. In an interview conducted in 
2008, the Dalai Lama himself remarked that most politicians meet with him before they 
become minister or president. After taking office, however, the very same politicians tend to 
avoid meeting with him so as not to endanger trade ties with China. The Dalai Lama 
concluded that “economic relations with China gain the upper hand.”28 New Zealand provides 
a prime example of such behavior. Prime Minister John Key, who was still in opposition in 
2007 and critical of the incumbent government’s decision not to receive the Dalai Lama, also 
chose not to meet with the religious figure in 2009 after his party had come into power. 
                                                          
26
 It should be noted that, according to the usual protocol, the president of the German parliament is a higher-
ranking officer than the chancellor. Notwithstanding, the chancellor has significantly more political power and 
greater public visibility. Following the ‘chancellor principle’, he or she is responsible for all government policies 
and issues the formal policy guidelines. 
27
“DALAI LAMA: CAN I EVER TELL YOU HOW SORRY I AM?” The Santiago Times, May 16th 2006, available at: 
http://www.santiagotimes.cl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9130:DALAI-LAMA:-CAN-I-EVER-
TELL-YOU-HOW-SORRY-I-AM?&catid=1:other&Itemid=38. 
28
 „Ich will eine echte Autonomie,“ Cicero Magazin für Politische Kultur, 2009, own translation, available at: 
http://www.cicero.de/97.php?ress_id=1&item=2503. 
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Therefore, the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ should depend on the rank or the political importance of 
the dignitary met. Meetings with higher-ranked politicians pose a greater affront to the 
Chinese, who may then retaliate through a more pronounced reduction in bilateral trade: 
Hypothesis 2: The detrimental effect of Dalai Lama meetings on trade grows with the 
rank of the dignitary met. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Evolvement over time 
Assuming that the reduction of commercial activity is intended to convey a warning to other 
trading partners, extensive prolongation of the measure might cause the implied welfare 
losses to outweigh the political benefits that China attains from increased political compliance 
of its trading partners. Facing a trade-off between the economic losses from trade diversion 
and the political gains from stabilizing the regime, it is in China’s interest that trade ties are 
restored as quickly as possible to reduce the losses that arise from the political bias in its 
importing decisions. In particular, it seems reasonable to believe that China cannot afford to 
substitute more differentiated goods from a Dalai Lama-receiving country in the long run. At 
the same time, the partner economies are also interested in a restoration of trade ties with 
China and are likely to direct diplomatic efforts towards restoring these bilateral relations. 
Anecdotal evidence confirms that diplomatic ties are usually restored after some period of 
time has passed following a reception of the Dalai Lama. However, China expects countries 
to make diplomatic concessions to correct for what it coins as their “wrongdoings”. For 
example, nine months after the meeting between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the 
Dalai Lama, bilateral relations were mended with considerable diplomatic efforts towards 
reconciliation. Shortly after a declaration of France that it recognized Tibet as integral part of 
the Chinese territory, France was due to receive a new Chinese trade delegation. In an 
article titled “France goes back on China’s shopping list,” the China Daily emphasizes a 
causal link between France’s compliance and the re-establishment of bilateral relations.29 
Similar reconciliation had to be achieved between China and Austria in September 2007. 
After a meeting between the Dalai Lama and Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer, 
diplomatic relations between Austria and China deteriorated significantly, leading to what the 
media described as a “minor ice-age” between the two countries. Media reported that 
Austrian diplomats were banned from contact with Chinese officials for about one year. In 
                                                          
29
 “France goes back on China's shopping list,” China Daily, October 29th 2009, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-10/29/content_8865307.htm. 
14 
 
October 2008, a state visit of the Austrian chancellor in Beijing marked the end of the 
diplomatic tensions caused by the Dalai Lama reception.30 
Therefore, we expect exports to China to recover after a while, i.e., that the trade-
deteriorating effect of Dalai Lama meetings is only of temporary nature: 
Hypothesis 3: The trade-deteriorating ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ disappears as bilateral 
relations between China and partner countries recover. 
If purchases were only postponed as a signal of temporary Chinese discontent after a Dalai 
Lama meeting, there might even occur a positive ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ after a while as Chinese 
imports rebound from past cutbacks. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data and Method 
We estimate econometrically whether and to what extent the diplomatic tensions caused by 
official receptions of the Dalai Lama impact negatively on the volume of exports to China. 
Our econometric model builds on the gravity equation of international trade, the workhorse of 
statistical analyses of trade flows, which translates Newton’s ‘Law of Universal Gravitation’ to 
economics. The gravity model assumes that bilateral trade is proportional to the product of 
the trading partners’ economic masses, proxied by GDP, and inversely proportional to the 
geographic distance between them. In order to control for country heterogeneity, we make 
use of partner country fixed effects. The effect of bilateral distance and other time-invariant 
factors, such as being landlocked or contiguous, is thus captured by the partner country fixed 
effects. In addition to partner country GDP, we add population size and the bilateral 
exchange rate to our specification, two frequently used variables in the gravity framework. 
Moreover, we control for time-specific factors by including dummy variables for each time 
period. We run the following econometric model: 
 = 	

 + 	 +  + ℎ +  +  +  
where  is the log of exports of partner country  to China at time  in current US 
dollars; 	 is the log of the partner country’s gross domestic product in current US dollars; 
 is the log of the partner country’s population size; ℎ is a nominal exchange rate 
index of the partner country’s local currency unit in Yuan;  and  are time and country fixed 
effects; and   is a stochastic error. Trade data is obtained from the United Nations 
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 „Gusenbauer: Irritationen mit China ausgeräumt,“ Die Presse.com, October 24th 2008, available at: 
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/425083/index.do?from=suche.intern.portal. 
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COMTRADE database.31 Data on GDP, population size and exchange rates are drawn from 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009). 
Our variable of interest is the binary dummy variable 	

, which takes a value of 1 if the 
Dalai Lama was received by a dignitary in the partner country in year  or  − 1.32 Information 
on the travel pattern of the Buddhist leader is obtained from the Office of His Holiness the 
14th Dalai Lama.33 The variable is coded in four different ways: In its narrowest definition, we 
only include Dalai Lama meetings with heads of state or government. Our second definition 
extends the first by including all meetings between the Dalai Lama and government 
members. By also adding encounters with speakers of parliament, the third definition 
produces a dummy variable that accounts for all meetings between the Dalai Lama and 
national officials. Finally, we construct a variable that incorporates all meetings of the Tibetan 
leader that are listed by the Office of the Dalai Lama. This definition also includes regional 
leaders, party leaders, ex-presidents, ambassadors and scientists, among others. A detailed 
overview on the various definitions of the Dalai Lama dummy is provided in Table A1. 
Furthermore, we construct a binary dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Dalai Lama 
travelled to a Chinese trading partner country in a given year, irrespective of whether or not 
the Tibetan leader met with any dignitary there. 
Our dataset covers the period 1991 to 2008, starting with the end of the Cold War and 
concluding with the most recent year for which trade data is currently available. 
Hypothesizing that a potential ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ might only be observable in more recent 
years, in which China’s economic and political power grew significantly, we furthermore split 
our dataset into two periods: 1991-2001 and 2002-2008. Several arguments motivate 2002 
as an appropriate point at which to split our sample. First, the leadership change that 
occurred when Huo Jintao took power of the Communist Party in 2002 may have reoriented 
China’s foreign policy towards a more assertive advocacy of its global interests. Second, 
China became a WTO member in December 2001, which is likely to have significantly 
affected China’s trading relations. Third, the September 11 attacks mark an important 
change in the global political order comparable to the end of the Cold War, which, in turn, 
marks the first year of our full sample. Next, we extend the analysis by restricting our sample 
to European partner countries to compare the results from previous estimations with those 
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 Since Belgium and Luxembourg did not report trade data separately for the years prior to 1999, we use the 
GDP-weighted values of exports from Belgium-Luxembourg instead. 
32
 The reason why we also include the lagged value is because it may take some time for the diplomatic tensions 
to translate into an actual decrease in trade values. Since trade flows are tied to contracts, the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ 
may only become visible in trade statistics with a certain time delay. However, our results do not hinge on this 
assumption. At a later point, we also show results for different definitions of the variable of interest. 
33
 Data is available at http://www.dalailama.com/. Information was completed with information provided on 
www.buddhismtoday.com. 
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for this more homogenous set of countries.34 Europe has been the most important travel 
destination of the Tibetan head of government-in-exile. Leaving aside the Dalai Lama’s host 
country India, of the 266 trips that the he made between 1991 and 2008, 160 of them were to 
European countries. 
All models are estimated using two estimation strategies: First, we run Fixed Effects 
regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering across partner countries since a 
modified Wald test indicates groupwise heteroskedasticity.35 Second, we rerun all models 
using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) to account for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity across panels and autocorrelation.36 We employ a common AR(1) term as 
an estimation with a panel-specific AR(1) term would lead to biased results. As noted by 
Beck and Katz (1995), in contrast to a panel-specific AR(1) term, the use of the FGLS 
correction for a common AR(1) is unlikely to lead to inaccurate estimations of the standard 
errors. 
Figure 1 provides a geographical overview of the Dalai Lama’s travel pattern between 1991 
and 2008, whereas Figure 2 and Figure 3 show a map indicating where and how many times 
the Dalai Lama was received by a government official or a political leader, respectively. In 
many cases, the Dalai Lama was not received by any government member during a visit to a 
country. Russia and Spain, both of which struggle with independence movements, are 
examples of this. Table A2 lists all the variables employed in the analysis along with their 
definitions and sources. Table A3 provides descriptive statistics on all variables. Finally, 
Table A4 lists all countries included in the analysis. 
 
4.2 Main results 
Table 1.1 reports empirical results for the entire sample testing our first hypothesis that 
meetings between the Dalai Lama and foreign officials have a trade-deteriorating effect. 
Results are reported for both Fixed Effects and FGLS. Starting with the results from the 
Fixed Effects regression, we find a negative coefficient on our dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if a government member has received the Tibetan leader in the current or previous 
year. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant in the second sub-period, which 
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 Our definition of European countries excludes members of the Community of Independent States (CIS) to 
create a rather homogeneous group of countries. However, our results do not hinge on this definition. 
 
35
 There is an emerging literature on biased estimates caused by the prevalence of zero trade flows in gravity 
models. In our sample, however, this issue seems to be negligible since the number of zero export flows is very 
small in our sample (57 of 2,269 observations). 
36
 Following the results of the Wooldridge Test for Serial Autocorrelation, we reject the null hypothesis of ‘no first 
order autocorrelation’ in our sample. 
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covers the Hu Jintao era (2002-2008).37 This result is in line with the increased political and 
economic power China acquired in the world in recent years. We find that Dalai Lama 
meetings decrease exports to China by 12.5% on average.38 The coefficient is statistically 
significant at the five percent level. This effect is comparable in size to the effect of a state 
visit in Nitsch (2007) – though, of course, running in the opposite direction. FGLS results 
confirm the negative effect of Dalai Lama receptions on exports to China in the second sub-
period. The expected impact on trade is significant at the five percent level and, with 5.7%, 
considerably smaller than the effect estimated under Fixed Effects. In addition, the FGLS 
results unveil a negative effect for the first sub-period as well as for the overall sample. 
Closer investigation, however, reveals that this finding is driven by SITC product group 9, a 
rather heterogeneous group of products.39 
In five of the six models in Table 1.1, the coefficient on GDP is positive and thus in line with 
the gravity model of trade. It is only in the Fixed Effects model for the second sub-period that 
we do not find the expected positive coefficient on GDP. However, if we exclude the time 
dummies, the coefficient becomes positive and significant (Results available upon request). 
A possible explanation for this might be that China’s major trading partners were on the 
same business cycle during the second sub-period. Turning to the effect of the population 
size of China’s trading partners, the corresponding coefficient is positive in all models, but 
not significant at conventional levels in the first sub-period. This positive coefficient suggests 
the existence of export-promoting scale effects as a result of a larger population size. The 
coefficient on the nominal exchange rate is positive in the FGLS estimations for the overall 
sample and the second sub-period, which shows that a depreciation of the partner country’s 
currency with respect to the Chinese Renminbi has a positive effect on their exports to 
China. Summing up to this point, empirical results consistently confirm that there is a trade-
deteriorating effect caused by foreign officials receiving the Dalai Lama in the 2002- 2008 
period (Hu Jintao era). In what follows, we thus restrict our analysis to this relevant time 
period. 
Column 2 of Table 1.2 shows results for a sample restricted to the more homogenous group 
of European countries that accounts for roughly half of all Dalai Lama receptions by 
government members. For the reader’s convenience, we also show the results of our 
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 As a robustness check, we ran 159 regressions of the same model specification, each time excluding one of 
China’s trading partners. In each case, the coefficient remained negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
38
 exp(–0.133) – 1 = –12.5% 
39
 We ran the same regression with product subgroups and found results in the first period (1991-2001) to be 
driven by exports from SITC group 9 (‘Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC’). The 
negative significant effect of Dalai Lama meetings on exports vanishes when we exclude this group from the 
regression (Results available on request). SITC product group 9 consists of ‘Postal packages not classified 
according to kind’, ‘Special transactions and commodities not classified according to kind’, ‘Coin (other than gold 
coin), not being legal tender’, and ‘Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and concentrates)’.  
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baseline regressions from Table 1.1 in column 1 (Fixed Effects) and column 6 (FGLS) of 
Table 1.2. We find evidence in favor of a trade-deteriorating effect also in our European 
subsample. The estimated negative effect of Dalai Lama meetings at government level on 
European exports to China amounts to 11.5% in the Fixed Effects regression and 13.1% in 
the FGLS regression. 
Next, we include three additional control variables to our baseline regression to further test 
the robustness of our results. In a first step, we assess the effect of partner countries’ export 
orientation on exports to China. While time-invariant country characteristics are captured by 
the country fixed effects, changes in export orientation across time are not accounted for in 
our baseline model. We hypothesize that exports to China grow over time when a partner 
country’s export orientation increases. The export orientation of China’s trading partners is 
measured as the total exports to all countries except China as a share of GDP. Trade data is 
again retrieved from UN COMTRADE and GDP data is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2009). The effect of export orientation is found to be 
insignificant in the Fixed Effects regression (column 3). However, in the FGLS estimation, the 
coefficient is significant at the one percent level and correctly signed (column 8). 
Independently of the estimation strategy, the coefficient on our Dalai Lama variable is stable 
and remains significant at conventional levels. 
As a second control variable, we add the log of the trade-weighted bilateral tariff rate to our 
baseline model in order to account for tariff barriers to trade between each country and 
China. 40  Tariff data is taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database. In both regression 
frameworks, the coefficient on the dummy variable for the reception of the Dalai Lama by a 
government member is robust to the inclusion of tariff rates. While the tariff coefficient is 
found to be negative, as in line with theory, it is only significant in the FGLS estimation. The 
addition of tariff rates slightly increases the absolute size of the coefficient on the Dalai Lama 
variable in the FGLS framework (column 9) and leaves the coefficient in the Fixed Effects 
setting virtually unchanged (column 4). In both cases, the coefficient remains significant at 
the five percent level. This finding can be taken as an indication that the trade-reducing ‘Dalai 
Lama Effect’ does not operate via an increase of tariff barriers. 
The third additional control variable aims to account for the effect of political friendship or 
hostility on trade with China. A frequently used measure for the extent of bilateral friendship 
is the degree to which countries vote in line with each other in the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) (e.g., Richardson and Kegley 1980, Barro and Lee 2005, Dreher and 
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 Arguably, China’s import tariffs themselves may be affected by diplomatic tensions caused by meetings of 
foreign officials with the Tibetan leader. Hence, the estimated coefficient on the Dalai Lama variable has to be 
attributed to other channels than the bilateral tariff rate. 
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Jensen 2007, Kastner 2007, Dreher and Gassebner 2008). The measure, though it has its 
drawbacks, also has the advantage that it is available for virtually every country in the world 
over a long time period. We construct a variable for capturing the voting coincidence at the 
assembly using the same method as Richardson and Kegley (1980) and Thacker (1999).41 
Therefore, our indicator of friendship with China is the number of times that a trading partner 
had the same voting behavior as China as a fraction of all voting instances. Votes in 
agreement are coded as 1, votes in disagreement as 0 and abstentions and absences as 
0.5. The regressions in columns 5 and 10 in Table 1.2 show that greater amity with China 
seems to promote trade, but that the effect is only statistically significant in the FGLS 
regression and has a negligible impact on the size of the Dalai Lama dummy variable. 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we run a modified version of the basic regression for the 
relevant time period (2002-2008), accounting for the different ranks of dignitaries met by the 
Dalai Lama. To this end, we include four dummy variables with increasingly broader 
definitions of dignitaries met. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable, which takes a value 
of 1 if the Dalai Lama travelled to the country – regardless of whether he was received by 
any dignitary. All dummy variables take a value of 1 if an event was registered in the current 
or previous year. 
The regressions in columns 1 to 5 (Fixed Effects) and 10 to 14 (FGLS) in Table 2 confirm our 
hypothesis that the trade deteriorations caused by Dalai Lama meetings are associated with 
the rank of the dignitary that receives the Tibetan leader. We find that meetings between the 
Dalai Lama and political leaders, defined as head of state or government, have the greatest 
significant negative impact on exports to China. Dalai Lama meetings at highest political level 
reduce exports to China by 16.9% according to the Fixed Effects results and by 8.1% in our 
FGLS regression framework. Smaller, but still significant, effects are found when the 
definition of our variable of interest is extended to include government members and national 
officials, respectively. The effect is again smaller for the group including all dignitaries listed 
by the Office of the Dalai Lama. The corresponding coefficient is only significant at the 10% 
level in the FGLS regression and even becomes statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels in the Fixed Effects regression. 
Since meetings with political leaders seem to have the highest impact, we test whether 
additional effects occur when the Dalai Lama is furthermore received by lower ranked 
dignitaries. As shown in columns 6 to 8 (Fixed Effects) and columns 15 to 17 (FGLS), there 
is no additional effect for lower-ranked dignitaries meeting the Dalai Lama in addition to the 
effect found for political leaders. When controlling for receptions at the highest political level, 
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 The UNGA roll-call voting data is made available by Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009). We thank Axel Dreher for 
providing us with a Stata do-file to process the data. 
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each coefficient for meetings at a lower level is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.42 The coefficient on the dummy indicating the presence of the Dalai Lama in the 
country – irrespective of whether he was received by a dignitary – is statistically not 
significant at conventional levels in the Fixed Effects (column 5) and loses its significance in 
the FGLS regression when controlling whether an encounter with the Tibetan leader took 
place (column 18). This underlines that the effect is only caused by a meeting with a foreign 
leader whereas the mere presence of the Dalai Lama in the respective country has no effect. 
Having shown that the trade-deteriorating effect is driven by meetings with heads of state or 
government, we focus on these meetings in the following regression analyses. Table 3 
shows how the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ evolves over time in a Fixed Effects and in an FGLS 
regression framework (Hypothesis 3). In order to compare the effect of Dalai Lama meetings 
over time, we include separate dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the Tibetan leader is 
received by a political leader in the next year, current year, previous year, two years ago and 
three years ago, respectively. Starting again with the worldwide sample, we find statistically 
significant negative coefficients on the Dalai Lama dummies for the current and previous 
years. Both coefficients are similar in size and a t-test does not reject the null hypothesis that 
the two coefficients are equal in size at the 10% level. All other coefficients on the Dalai 
Lama variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels. We thus conclude that 
the trade-reducing impact of Dalai Lama meetings disappears after two years, which 
confirms Hypothesis 3. Turning to our smaller European sample, we find a similar pattern. 
The coefficient for Dalai Lama meetings in the current year is statistically significant at the 
five percent level, but the coefficient on the dummy for a Dalai Lama reception in the 
previous year loses significance in the Fixed Effects regression, while retaining significance 
in the FGLS regression. 
 
4.3. Endogeneity concerns 
In analogy to the reverse causal relationship between trade and military conflicts (e.g., Glick 
and Taylor 2005), the precise nature of the causal link between diplomatic conflicts and trade 
is unclear. On the one hand, we hypothesize that receiving the Dalai Lama leads to reduced 
exports to China. On the other hand, stronger commercial ties might also make it less likely 
that a political leader invites the Tibetan head of government-in-exile in the first place. There 
are good reasons to believe that a country is more reluctant to receive the Buddhist leader if 
                                                          
42
 When restricting our sample to European countries, a similar pattern emerges. Once more, we find the largest 
effect for Dalai Lama meetings with political leaders. Again, the coefficients for Dalai Lama meetings with lower-
ranked dignitaries are substantially smaller. In the Fixed Effects regression, however, the size of the coefficient for 
a Dalai Lama meeting with any dignitary outperforms the size of the corresponding dummy restricted to 
government members or national officials. Results are available upon request. 
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it has a well-established trade relationship with China, which it does not want to jeopardize. 
In addition to this reverse causality problem, third variables might be omitted that impact on 
both Dalai Lama meetings and exports to China. 
We employ a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) model to account for the potential 
endogeneity of Dalai Lama meetings. The crucial point in a 2SLS regression framework is 
the choice of an appropriate instrument, which explains sufficiently well Dalai Lama meetings 
with political leaders, but is uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression. 
According to the exclusion restriction, an appropriate instrument should not affect exports to 
China through channels other than the potentially endogenous variable, i.e., the dummy for 
Dalai Lama receptions. In other words, an appropriate instrument should have no direct 
influence on exports to China. In order to find suitable instruments, one needs to get a better 
understanding of the Dalai Lama’s travel behavior. According to the Dalai Lama himself, 
most visits abroad follow from invitations from Tibetan and Buddhist communities (Gyatso 
1990). During his stays abroad, the Dalai Lama gives lectures and religious speeches and 
meets local Buddhist communities. While most meetings with lower-ranked dignitaries are 
scheduled long in advance, it is usually unclear some weeks or even days before the Dalai 
Lama embarks on a journey, whether he will be received by high-ranked officials. 43 In some 
cases, the head of state or government just “drops in” while the Dalai Lama is being received 
by a lower-ranked government member. The political leader’s decision process of whether to 
receive the Dalai Lama or not is usually accompanied by discussions in the media and 
demands from pro-Tibet lobby groups. 
We employ the following three instruments in an attempt to control for endogeneity: The first 
instrument is the binary dummy variable discussed above, which takes a value of 1 if the 
Dalai Lama travelled to a partner country in a given year. The underlying idea is that the 
Tibetan leader is more likely to meet with officials in those years in which he travels to their 
respective partner countries. Most meetings with foreign dignitaries take place in the 
dignitary’s own country, although Dalai Lama meetings have also occurred in third-party 
countries such as in 2008 when French president Nicolas Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama 
in Poland. As outlined above, the Dalai Lama usually fixes his travel itinerary based on 
invitations from Buddhist or Tibetan communities to give teachings and public talks. Since his 
travel plans do generally not follow invitations from political leaders, we assume that our 
instrument is exogenous. The validity of the instrument is further supported by the empirical 
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 For example, shortly before the Dalai Lama’s arrival in Italy in 2003, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi left open 
whether he would accept the invitation of the Italian Parliamentary Group for Tibet to meet with the Tibetan 
leader. Finally, he refused the invitation. In the forerun of a trip to Mongolia in 2006, it remained unclear whether 
or not the Dalai Lama would be received by President Nambaryn Enkhbayar during his stay in the country. In the 
end, no meeting was scheduled. In a similar manner, the encounter of the Austrian chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer 
in 2007 was made public only one day before the actual meeting took place. 
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results in Table 2, which shows that Dalai Lama travels do not have a statistically significant 
direct effect on exports to China. Our second instrument is the number of days that the Dalai 
Lama spent in a partner country. We hypothesize that the longer the duration of the Dalai 
Lama’s stay in a country, the greater will be the public awareness of his presence in the 
country, the more intense will be the public discussion regarding his potential official 
reception, and the greater will be the pressure on political leaders to receive him. 
As a third instrument, we use the number of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) in a trading partner 
country. TSGs are non-governmental organizations formed voluntarily and maintained by 
private individuals with the aim of rallying regional, national, or international awareness of 
and support for the Tibet issue. TSGs work independently from the Central Tibetan 
Administration and act as non-profit organizations that are open to any individuals willing to 
join the pro-Tibet movement. The larger the pro-Tibetan network in a partner country, the 
more inclined the political leader might be to receive the Dalai Lama in order to satisfy the 
demands of these pressure groups. Moreover, the number of TSGs may serve as a proxy for 
the extent to which a country’s population is interested in the Tibet issue. 
The dataset on the number of TSGs was established based on a list of pro-Tibet movements 
that was released by the Central Tibetan Administration in exile.44 We construct a time series 
by collecting information on the year of foundation of each TSG to account for the evolution 
of the pro-Tibet movement over time. In order to get information for those TSGs that do not 
provide this information on their homepage, we conducted a survey via e-mail and fax. Using 
this approach, we obtained information on the founding year for about 53.8% of all listed 295 
organizations. Unfortunately, insufficient information is available on the number of members 
of each group so that we cannot account for differences in size between Tibet NGOs. With 
31 recorded organizations, most TSGs in our sample are located in France, followed by the 
United States with 20 Tibet NGOs. 
The first stage results of our 2SLS estimation approach (not displayed) are in line with our 
expectations: the likelihood that a political leader meets the Dalai Lama increases when the 
Tibetan head of government in exile travels to the leader’s country, increases with the 
duration of the visit and also increases with the number of Tibet Support Groups in the 
partner country. The Angrist-Pischke test of excluded instruments displayed in Table 6 
generally underlines the relevance of the instruments selected in the first stage. Only in the 
smaller European sample does the F statistic fall below the critical rule of thumb value of 10 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). 
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The regressions in columns 1 to 5 of Table 4 show the results for the second stage 
regressions of our 2SLS approach.45 Again, we present results for the relevant time period 
(2002-2008). Starting with the worldwide sample (column 1), the coefficient on the dummy 
variable indicating whether the Dalai Lama was received by a head of state or head of 
government in the current or previous year is negative and statistically significant, i.e., we still 
find that Dalai Lama meetings have a trade-deteriorating effect when controlling for potential 
endogeneity. The coefficient is somewhat larger than in the Fixed Effects regression (Table 
1.2, column 1). For the European subsample, displayed in column 2 of Table 4, the Dalai 
Lama coefficient is significant at the five percent level and again is larger than in the Fixed 
Effects regression (Table 1.2, column 2). 
In order to shed light on the timing of the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’, we include two dummy 
variables, the first taking a value of 1 if a Dalai Lama meeting took place in the current period 
and the second taking a value of 1 if the Dalai Lama was received in the previous period. 
The results in column 3 of Table 4 show that the coefficients for both dummy variables have 
the expected negative signs, are of similar size and are significant at the ten percent level. 
Tests for overidentification (Hansen J) and tests for underidentification (Kleinbergen Paap 
LM test) also confirm the validity of our instruments. Even though the 2SLS regression 
results support our previous findings, note that the C test for endogeneity does not reject the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Dalai Lama dummy.46 Consequently, the Fixed Effects 
estimates discussed in Section 4.2 are more efficient than the 2SLS estimates. 
Next, we tackle a further endogeneity issue, which stems from the potential endogeneity of 
lagged export values in an extended model. Since trade relationships are persistent over 
time, we include lagged exports as an additional explanatory variable in order to explain 
current exports to China as a function of past export values. Established commercial ties and 
signed contracts mean that exports evolve with inertia. It is possible that the lagged exports 
variable is endogenous in a short panel, which could lead to biased results (Nickell 1981). 
Unobserved panel level effects may be correlated with lagged exports, thereby making the 
2SLS estimator inconsistent. In order to address this issue, we apply the two-step System 
GMM estimator, which incorporates equations in first differences and in levels (Arellano and 
Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). Since we have a small T in our setting (T=7), we 
employ the Windmeijer correction to obtain corrected standard errors, which are larger and 
much more reliable in finite samples (Windmeijer 2005). Meetings with the Dalai Lama are 
treated as endogenous and all additional covariates as strictly exogenous. Furthermore, we 
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 All results are based on the user-written Stata command xtivreg2 (Schaffer 2005). 
46
 Under conditional homoskedasticity, the C statistic is numerically equal to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
However, its main advantage is that it is robust to violations of conditional homoskedasticity (see Hayashi 2000, 
pp. 232-234). 
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include time fixed effects and employ the same external instruments as in the 2SLS 
regression framework discussed above. To limit the number of instruments, the matrix of 
instruments is collapsed as proposed in Roodman (2009). 
Before proceeding to the GMM estimation results, column 4 of Table 4 reports for 
comparison the 2SLS results when lagged exports are included as an additional control 
variable. The coefficient on lagged exports to China is statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Interestingly, the Dalai Lama dummy indicating a meeting with a political leader 
in the previous period becomes insignificant once we include the lagged exports variable. 
Arguably, the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ of meetings in the previous period is already (partially) 
captured in the lagged export variable. However, the dummy variable indicating a reception 
of the Tibetan leader in the current period remains statistically significant at conventional 
levels as expected. In column 5, we therefore exclude the dummy variable indicating a Dalai 
Lama meeting in the previous period. The coefficients on the remaining variables remain 
virtually unchanged. 
Column 6 shows our GMM regression results for the worldwide sample.47 The estimated 
coefficient on Dalai Lama meetings is negative, statistically significant at the five percent 
level, and of similar size as the corresponding value in the 2SLS setting. The coefficient on 
the lagged exports variable has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at 
the five percent level. The Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used does not reject 
the exogeneity of the covariates. The Arellano-Bond test rejects the hypothesis of second 
order autocorrelation in the data, which needs to be absent in order for the estimator to be 
consistent. As a final robustness check, we exclude France in column 7 and India in column 
8 from our sample, since both countries show extreme values in the distribution of our 
instrumental variables. France is by far the country with the most Tibet Support Groups (31 in 
our sample). India, in turn, is the country that experiences the longest Dalai Lama visits (up 
to 124 days per year). Nevertheless, when separately excluding the two countries from the 
GMM regression, our variable of interest remains statistically significant at the five percent 
level (columns 7 and 8). We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by these 
outliers. 
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 All results are based on the user-written Stata command xtabond2 (Roodman 2009). 
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4.4 Results by product group 
Finally, we investigate, which product groups drive the trade-deteriorating ‘Dalai Lama 
Effect’. As indicated in the first column of Table 5.1, the value of exports to China is 
especially concentrated among the following SITC product groups: ‘Machinery and transport 
equipment’ (41.0% of total exports to China), ‘Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material’ (13.3%), ‘Chemicals and related products’ (12.4%) and ‘Crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels’ (12.1%). Exports of goods of the most important product group, ‘Machinery and 
transport equipment’, are expected to be closely associated with the state of political 
relations between countries as negotiations over the purchase of such goods are commonly 
carried out during the course of high-rank trade talks between national representatives and 
trade delegations. Running separate regressions for each SITC product group, Table 5.1 
reports the full-sample results for the period 2002 to 2008. With the exception of ‘Beverages 
and tobacco’, the coefficients for all subgroups exhibit the expected negative sign in the 
Fixed Effects and FGLS regressions. However, only SITC group 7, which incorporates 
‘Machinery and transport equipment’, the most important product group, turns out to be 
statistically significant in both regression frameworks. In the FGLS setting, we furthermore 
find a statistically significant and negative coefficient for ‘Food, live animals’, ‘Crude 
materials’ and ‘Mineral fuels’. 
Table 5.2 reports our results when the regressions are repeated for European countries. 
Results are found to be more diverse in the European sample. In the Fixed Effects 
regressions, we find negative and statistically significant results for the group of ‘Food, live 
animals’ and, once again, ‘Machinery and transport equipment’. The coefficients on Dalai 
Lama meetings for the remaining groups are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. In the FGLS regressions, statistically significant effects at conventional levels are 
found for ‘Crude materials’, ‘Mineral fuels’, ‘Chemicals’, and ‘Machinery and transport 
equipment’. 
Therefore, the only product group for which we find a statistically significant negative effect at 
conventional levels for both samples and both estimation techniques is ‘Machinery and 
transport equipment’. This result suggests that the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ exists predominantly 
for those goods that are commonly sold in the course of state visits and trade missions. Our 
results lend at least weak support in favor of a ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ operating through 
consumer opinions since negative coefficients on Dalai Lama meetings are found for 
consumption goods, namely ‘Food, live animals’ and ‘Miscellaneous manufactured articles’. 
Finally, there is at least some evidence that strategic goods such as ‘Crude materials’ and 
‘Mineral fuels’ are not free from political influences. This contradicts Polachek (1980), who 
argues that oil exports show a low export elasticity to conflict between trading partners, as 
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oil-dependent economies have little choice but to continue importing the product regardless 
of any bilateral conflicts with an oil-exporting country. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The article contributes to the literature on the link between bilateral political relations and 
international trade through an assessment of the importance of the state of bilateral relations 
for trade with China. The Chinese administration frequently threatens, in a more-or-less open 
manner, that meetings between its trading partners’ officials and the Dalai Lama will be met 
with animosity and lead to subsequent deterioration in their trade relationships. Using data 
on the travel pattern of the Dalai Lama, we run a gravity model of exports to China from 159 
partner countries in 1991-2008 to test for political influences on China’s trading decisions. All 
models are estimated using Fixed Effects with clustered standard errors and Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with a common AR(1) term. In order to account for the 
potential endogeneity of meetings with the Dalai Lama, the number of Tibet Support Groups 
and the travel pattern of the Buddhist leader are used as instruments in 2SLS and GMM 
regressions. 
Empirical evidence confirms the existence of a trade-deteriorating effect of Dalai Lama 
receptions for the Hu Jintao era (2002-2008). However, we find at best weak evidence to 
support the existence of such an effect in earlier years. While our results suggest that 
systematic trade reductions are only caused by meetings with heads of state or government, 
no additional impact is found for meetings between the Dalai Lama and lower-ranking 
officials. As a consequence of a political leader’s reception of the Dalai Lama in the current 
or previous period, exports to China are found to decrease by 8.1% or 16.9%, depending on 
the estimation technique used. Furthermore, we find that this effect will have disappeared 
two years after a meeting took place. Analyzing disaggregated export data, ‘Machinery and 
transport equipment’ is found to be the only product group with a consistent negative effect of 
Dalai Lama meetings on exports across samples and estimation techniques. 
To sum up, we find strong evidence that bilateral political relations matter for trade with 
China, which lends support to the findings of the growing literature on the political 
determinants of trade. Chinese trade relations are not free of political biases and the country 
seems to exploit trade ties as a foreign policy tool. While political leaders should be aware of 
potential export losses when receiving the Dalai Lama, not meeting with him is not the only 
inevitable policy conclusion in order to safeguard commercial interests. Internationally 
coordinated receptions of the Dalai Lama by political leaders or even joint meetings are a 
possibility to reconcile economic interests with the demands to receive the Tibetan leader. 
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Such a strategy may reduce China’s scope to play one trading partner off against another. 
Nonetheless, with the increasing economic power of China and other emerging countries, the 
(ab)use of trade ties as a foreign policy tool is likely to gain in importance.  
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Table 1.1 Hypothesis 1: Exports to China and Dalai Lama meetings of government 
members (all countries) 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 Alternative model specifications: Exports to China and Dalai Lama 
meetings of government members (2002-2008) 
 
 
 
1991-2008 1991-2001 2002-2008 1991-2008 1991-2001 2002-2008
DL meets government member -0.104 -0.101 -0.133** -0.079** -0.060* -0.059**
[0.288] [0.355] [0.027] [0.021] [0.067] [0.011]
Log of GDP 0.598** 0.819** -0.007 0.199** 0.312*** 0.382***
[0.019] [0.040] [0.981] [0.010] [0.004] [0.000]
Log of population 3.643*** 2.809 3.411** 0.498*** 0.270 2.689***
[0.002] [0.104] [0.035] [0.001] [0.179] [0.000]
Log of exchange rate -0.047 -0.058 0.158 0.042* -0.024 0.270***
[0.617] [0.598] [0.357] [0.084] [0.407] [0.000]
R squared 0.444 0.129 0.280
Observations 2062 1142 912 2062 1142 912
Number of countries 159 148 151 159 148 151
Standard errors in OLS Fixed Effects regressions are adjusted for clustering across partner countries.
FGLS AR(1)Fixed Effects
Note: All regressions with country and time fixed effects.
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FGLS regressions are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels and first order autocorrelation.
World Europe World World World World Europe World World World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DL meets government member -0.133** -0.122* -0.136** -0.132** -0.127** -0.059** -0.140*** -0.043* -0.065** -0.064***
[0.027] [0.098] [0.023] [0.030] [0.035] [0.011] [0.003] [0.084] [0.011] [0.006]
Log of GDP -0.007 0.362 -0.025 -0.147 -0.014 0.382*** 0.691*** 0.331*** 0.240*** 0.359***
[0.981] [0.587] [0.931] [0.640] [0.962] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
Log of population 3.411** 2.208 3.250* 3.075* 3.325** 2.689*** -0.123 3.487*** 2.055*** 2.638***
[0.035] [0.495] [0.055] [0.055] [0.032] [0.000] [0.627] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log of exchange rate 0.158 -1.086 0.029 0.101 0.129 0.270*** -0.445 0.140** 0.186** 0.268***
[0.357] [0.320] [0.883] [0.566] [0.465] [0.000] [0.249] [0.026] [0.015] [0.000]
Other exports / GDP 2.757 2.098***
[0.150] [0.000]
Log of tariff rate -0.030 -0.064***
[0.761] [0.000]
UNGA voting alignment 2.020 0.718**
[0.208] [0.030]
R squared 0.280 0.502 0.294 0.296 0.283
Observations 912 247 906 887 912 912 247 906 887 912
Number of countries 151 36 150 148 151 151 36 150 148 151
Fixed Effects FGLS AR(1)
FGLS regressions are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels and first order autocorrelation.
Standard errors in OLS Fixed Effects regressions are adjusted for clustering across partner countries.
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: All regressions with country and time fixed effects.
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Table 2 Hypothesis 2: Exports to China and Dalai Lama meetings at various political levels (all countries, 2002-2008) 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
political leader -0.185** -0.193* -0.177* -0.208** -0.207** -0.084*** -0.082** -0.069** -0.076** -0.082***
[0.011] [0.068] [0.083] [0.043] [0.017] [0.002] [0.029] [0.040] [0.021] [0.006]
government member -0.133** 0.010 -0.059** -0.003
[0.027] [0.906] [0.011] [0.927]
national official -0.128** -0.009 -0.057** -0.019
[0.029] [0.904] [0.013] [0.476]
all dignitaries -0.086 0.028 -0.047** -0.013
[0.169] [0.745] [0.027] [0.599]
-0.058 0.033 -0.039* -0.013
[0.311] [0.617] [0.062] [0.559]
-0.031 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.009 -0.032 -0.030 -0.032 -0.036 0.351*** 0.382*** 0.386*** 0.386*** 0.402*** 0.352*** 0.357*** 0.354*** 0.355***
[0.920] [0.981] [0.984] [0.988] [0.976] [0.919] [0.922] [0.918] [0.908] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
3.433** 3.411** 3.403** 3.396** 3.369** 3.432** 3.434** 3.423** 3.421** 2.666*** 2.689*** 2.669*** 2.679*** 2.657*** 2.667*** 2.659*** 2.688*** 2.685***
[0.033] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.151 0.158 0.157 0.158 0.165 0.150 0.151 0.151 0.149 0.268*** 0.270*** 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.281*** 0.268*** 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.269***
[0.380] [0.357] [0.359] [0.359] [0.337] [0.380] [0.380] [0.379] [0.386] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R squared 0.280 0.280 0.280 0.279 0.279 0.280 0.280 0.280 0.280
912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
Standard errors in OLS Fixed Effects regressions are adjusted for clustering across partner countries. - FGLS regressions are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels and first order autocorrelation.
FGLS AR(1)
Note: All regressions with country and time fixed effects. - Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Fixed Effects
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Table 3 Hypothesis 3: Exports to China and Dalai Lama meetings of political 
leaders (time-event specification, 2002-2008) 
 
  
World Europe World Europe
DL met leader in t+1 -0.113 -0.092 -0.044 -0.037
[0.203] [0.276] [0.155] [0.629]
DL met leader in t -0.189** -0.183* -0.105*** -0.135*
[0.011] [0.065] [0.001] [0.064]
DL met leader in t-1 -0.192** -0.150 -0.087** -0.318***
[0.031] [0.300] [0.023] [0.000]
DL met leader in t-2 0.061 0.191 0.009 0.103
[0.441] [0.203] [0.827] [0.137]
DL met leader in t-3 -0.019 0.021 -0.016 -0.047
[0.778] [0.854] [0.611] [0.433]
Log of GDP -0.033 0.303 0.341*** 0.559***
[0.914] [0.667] [0.000] [0.001]
Log of population 3.368** 1.864 2.577*** 0.074
[0.042] [0.547] [0.000] [0.782]
Log of exchange rate 0.145 -1.127 0.266*** -0.435
[0.399] [0.304] [0.000] [0.259]
R squared 0.281 0.507
Observations 912 247 912 247
Number of Countries 151 36 151 36
Fixed Effects FGLS AR(1)
Note: All regressions with country and time fixed effects.
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors in OLS Fixed Effects regressions are adjusted for clustering across partner countries.
FGLS regressions are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels and first order autocorrelation.
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Table 4 Endogeneity: Exports to China and Dalai Lama meetings of political 
leaders (2002-2008) 
 
  
World Europe World World World World w/o FRA w/o IND
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DL meets political leader in t or t-1 -0.229* -0.242**
[0.052] [0.014]
DL meets political leader in t -0.202* -0.211* -0.195* -0.209** -0.245** -0.170**
[0.063] [0.057] [0.063] [0.019] [0.022] [0.027]
DL meets political leader in t-1 -0.221* -0.171
[0.082] [0.134]
Log of exports (t-1) 0.197** 0.198** 0.364*** 0.371** 0.358**
[0.024] [0.023] [0.010] [0.013] [0.012]
Log of GDP -0.041 0.255 -0.040 0.064 0.089 0.834*** 0.822*** 0.824***
[0.896] [0.697] [0.897] [0.822] [0.750] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log of population 3.458** 2.360 3.447** 3.505*** 3.401** 0.108* 0.130* 0.137
[0.031] [0.477] [0.032] [0.009] [0.011] [0.076] [0.095] [0.111]
Log of exchange rate 0.147 -1.117 0.147 0.130 0.138 0.194 0.189 0.257
[0.391] [0.305] [0.391] [0.410] [0.381] [0.310] [0.326] [0.204]
Angrist-Pischke F test 12.69 6.99 23.90/15.40 23.55/15.32 29.12
     (Test of excluded instruments) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000/0.000] [0.000/0.000] [0.000]
Hansen J 1.610 3.258 1.432 0.185 0.236 44.16 40.44 44.53
     (Overidentification test) [0.807] [0.516] [0.698] [0.980] [0.889] [0.631] [0.773] [0.575]
Kleinbergen Paap LM test 22.40 15.28 21.13 21.17 19.61
     (Underidentification test) [0.000] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Endogeneity test 0.082 0.038 0.073 1.131 1.407
[0.774] [0.846] [0.964] [0.568] [0.236]
Arellano-Bond test for AR1 in 1st differences -2.559 -2.524 -2.559
[0.011] [0.012] [0.011]
Arellano-Bond test for AR2 in 1st differences 1.233 1.242 1.216
[0.218] [0.214] [0.224]
R squared 0.280 0.504 0.280 0.379 0.378
Observations 912 247 912 863 863 870 863 863
Number of countries 151 36 151 142 142 149 148 148
Number of instruments 5 5 5 5 3 61 61 60
Note:
2SLS regressions with clustered standard errors, country and time fixed effects and instruments listed below.
System GMM with fixed time effects, Windmeijer finite sample correction and external instruments listed below.
Instruments (1)-(4): Number of Tibet Support Groups (lagged), Dalai Lama visit dummy (current and lagged) and Duration of Dalai Lama visit (in days, current and lagged)
Instruments (5)-(8): Number of Tibet Support Groups (lagged), Dalai Lama visit dummy (current) and Duration of Dalai Lama visit (in days, current)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
2SLS GMM
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Table 5.1 Results by product groups: Exports to China and Dalai Lama meetings 
of political leaders (all countries, 2002-2008) 
 
 
Table 5.2 Results by product groups:  Exports to China and Dalai Lama meetings 
of political leaders (European countries, 2002-2008) 
 
  
Product Group (SITC) % trade Obs. Countries
Food, live animals (0) 1.7% -0.197 [0.283] -0.107* [0.075] 710 124
Beverages and Tobacco (1) 0.2% 0.181 [0.545] 0.115 [0.319] 467 91
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (2) 12.1% -0.140 [0.328] -0.116*** [0.003] 840 140
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (3) 7.8% -0.432 [0.275] -0.352*** [0.000] 481 84
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes (4) 1.0% -0.206 [0.661] -0.046 [0.620] 349 69
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. (5) 12.4% -0.096 [0.593] -0.049 [0.194] 722 125
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (6) 13.3% -0.031 [0.874] -0.032 [0.499] 800 132
Machinery and transport equipment (7) 41.0% -0.605*** [0.000] -0.359*** [0.000] 756 129
Miscellaneous manufactured articles (8) 7.3% -0.232 [0.291] -0.105* [0.054] 754 128
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere (9) 2.2% -0.294 [0.324] -0.037 [0.675] 504 100
Standard errors in OLS Fixed Effects regressions are adjusted for clustering across partner countries.
% trade denotes the average share of each SITC product group in total exports to China in 2002-2008
World 2002-2008
FGLS regressions are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels and first order autocorrelation.
Fixed Effects FGLS AR(1)
Note: All regressions with country and time fixed effects.
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Product Group (SITC) % trade Obs. Countries
Food, live animals (0) 1.3% -0.539** [0.029] -0.160 [0.110] 213 33
Beverages and Tobacco (1) 0.4% 0.126 [0.784] 0.279 [0.177] 190 32
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (2) 5.7% -0.052 [0.742] -0.114* [0.084] 242 36
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (3) 1.0% -0.132 [0.695] -0.228* [0.087] 191 29
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes (4) 0.1% -0.280 [0.715] 0.100 [0.668] 142 26
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. (5) 9.5% -0.004 [0.985] -0.143** [0.011] 237 36
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (6) 12.5% -0.306 [0.187] -0.103 [0.171] 241 36
Machinery and transport equipment (7) 58.3% -0.396** [0.025] -0.286*** [0.000] 246 36
Miscellaneous manufactured articles (8) 7.0% -0.191 [0.304] -0.059 [0.262] 245 36
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere (9) 3.6% 0.060 [0.820] 0.074 [0.610] 177 30
Standard errors in OLS Fixed Effects regressions are adjusted for clustering across partner countries.
% trade denotes the average share of each SITC product group in total exports to China in 2002-2008
Europe 2002-2008
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FGLS regressions are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels and first order autocorrelation.
Fixed Effects FGLS AR(1)
Note: All regressions with country and time fixed effects.
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Figure 1 Geographic allocation of Dalai Lama visits (1991-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure 2 Geographic allocation of Dalai Lama receptions by government officials
  (1991-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure 3 Geographic allocation of Dalai Lama receptions by political leaders 
(1991-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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Table A1 Dalai Lama meetings ranked by dignitary met 
 
Information on the dignitaries met by the Dalai Lama is obtained from the webpage of the 
Office of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama. Dignitaries are grouped into the following four 
categories: 
 
Political Leaders 
- Head of state, president, king, pope, acting president 
- Head of government, prime minister, chancellor 
 
Government Members 
- All dignitaries listed under “Political Leaders” 
- Vice president, vice chancellor 
- Foreign minister 
- Minister, member of government 
 
National Officials 
- All dignitaries listed under “Government Members” 
- Speaker of parliament, (vice) president of parliament 
 
All dignitaries 
- All dignitaries listed under “National Officals” 
- Former president, former prime minister, first lady 
- Regional leader, governor, head of province 
- Party leader, leader of parliamentary group 
- Other religious leader, other royals 
- Deputies, ambassadors, special envoys 
- Nobel prize laureates, scientists  
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Table A2 Data description 
Variable Description Data source 
Total exports Log of total exports to China in given year from partner 
country (SITC Rev. 3) (in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Food, life animals Log of exports of Food, life animals in given year from 
partner country to China (SITC Group 0) (in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Beverages and Tobacco Log of exports of Beverages and Tobacco in given year from 
partner country to China (SITC Group 1) (in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels 
Log of exports of Crude materials, inedible, except fuels in 
given year from partner country to China (SITC Group 2) (in 
current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials 
Log of exports of Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials in given year from partner country to China (SITC 
Group 3) (in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Animal and vegetable oils, 
fats and waxes 
Log of exports of Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
in given year from partner country to China (SITC Group 4) 
(in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Chemicals and related 
products, n.e.s. 
Log of exports of Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. in 
given year from partner country to China (SITC Group 5) (in 
current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by 
material 
Log of exports of Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material in given year from partner country to China (SITC 
Group 6) (in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 
Log of exports of Machinery and transport equipment in given 
year from partner country to China (SITC Group 7) (in current 
US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
Log of exports of Miscellaneous manufactured articles in 
given year from partner country to China (SITC Group 8) (in 
current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Commodities and 
transactions not classified 
elsewhere in the SITC 
Log of exports of Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere in the SITC in given year from partner 
country to China (SITC Group 9) (in current US$) 
Comtrade via WITS 
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Dalai Lama meeting Binary dummy variable that is 1 if the Dalai Lama was 
received in partner country 
- By the head of state or head of government 
- By a member of government (additionally includes 
all ministers) 
- By a national official representative (additionally 
includes speakers of parliament) 
- By any dignitary listed by the Office of the Dalai 
Lama (additionally includes former heads of state or 
government, regional leaders, party leaders, 
scientists, special envoys and religious leaders, 
among others) 
Office of His Holiness the 
14th Dalai Lama 
Dalai Lama visits country Binary dummy variable that is 1 if the Dalai Lama travelled to 
partner country 
Office of His Holiness the 
14th Dalai Lama 
Duration of Dalai Lama 
visit 
Number of days the Dalai Lama visited a partner country Office of His Holiness the 
14th Dalai Lama 
Tibet Support Groups Number of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) in partner country 
and year (based on information on year of foundation of 
TSG) 
Central Tibetan 
Administration, own 
research 
Log of GDP Log of gross domestic product of partner country in current 
US dollars 
World Development 
Indicators 
Log of population Log of population size of partner country World Development 
Indicators 
Log of exchange rate Log of nominal exchange rate index (local currency unit per 
Yuan) (2000=100), which is calculated as the ratio of the 
official exchange rate LCU per US$ and the official exchange 
rate US$ per Chinese yuan 
World Development 
Indicators 
Other exports / GDP Total exports to all countries except China (as a share of 
GDP) 
Comtrade via WITS 
Log of tariff rate Log of trade-weighted bilateral tariff rate UNCTAD TRAINS via 
WITS 
UNGA voting alignment Number of times that a trading partner had the same voting 
behavior as China in the United General Assembly (as a 
share of all voting instances) 
Voeten and Merdzanovic 
(2009) 
Note: All data is available for 1991-2008. Information on Dalai Lama meetings and Dalai Lama visits was 
completed with information provided on www.buddhismtoday.com. 
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Table A3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exports to China (in million US$)
Total 2066 1780 7560 0 125000
Food, life animals 1564 53 156 0 2320
Beverages and Tobacco 963 9 37 0 451
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 1770 267 1190 0 20500
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 1028 278 979 0 11800
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 706 64 267 0 3900
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 1524 282 1230 0 17200
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 1768 286 1200 0 19700
Machinery and transport equipment 1649 919 4200 0 62900
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 1630 132 768 0 13900
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere 1042 82 445 0 7490
Variable of interest
Dalai Lama meeting with political leader in t or t-1 2066 0.07 0.26 0 1
Dalai Lama meeting with government member in t or t-1 2066 0.11 0.31 0 1
Dalai Lama meeting with national official in t or t-1 2066 0.11 0.31 0 1
Dalai Lama meeting with all dignitaries in t or t-1 2066 0.12 0.33 0 1
Dalai Lama visits country in t or t-1 2066 0.16 0.37 0 1
Instruments
Number of Tibet Support Groups 2066 0.79 2.83 0 31
Dalai Lama visit dummy 2066 0.10 0.30 0 1
Duration of Dalai Lama visit (in days) 2066 1.36 7.68 0 124
Controls
GDP (in million US$) 2066 282000 1060000 106 14200000
Population (in million) 2066 35 102 0 1140
Exchange rate (2000=100) 2066 1.28 11.45 0.00 508.66
Other exports / GDP 2053 27.15 20.74 0.31 176.26
Tariff rate 1983 11.80 11.62 0.00 95.50
UNGA voting alignment with China 2041 78.89 12.88 13.64 96.10
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Table A4 List of countries 
 
Note: All countries included in the European subsample are marked with an asterix (*). 
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Nb of years DL met with political leader (2002-2008) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum of days DL spent in country (2002-2008) 0 0 4 0 8 6 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 7 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 169 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nb of Tibet Support Groups (2008) 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
